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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR ROWLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
GllA \TEN BROTHERS & COMPANY, INC., aka GRAVEN
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

'

I
Case N o.
12384

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff, a trucker, was injured while delivering
pipe to defendant's yard, when the pipe came loose.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
On jury trial before Aldon J. Anderson, Judge,
the Yerdict was contributing neligence against both
sides.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a new trial.

STATElVIENT OF FACTS
Due to the size of the transcript, the facts and
issues are stated first in summary form, then in greater
detail. All references are to transcript page numbers,
including testimony.
Plaintiff, an independent contractor, delivered a
load of pipe to defendant's yard in Salt Lake City. During unloading, plaintiff undid his chains securing the
pipe. The pipe rolled. Plaintiff was injured as a result.
Plaintiff introduced evidence to prove that def endant had the duty to put blocks along the pipe to hold it
while he removed the chains, that defendant did block
the pipe, but inadequately, told plaintiff it was blocked
and
could safely unchain, and plaintiff acted in re·
liance without personally checking the blocks, and that
in so acting he conformed to acceptable trade customs.
Defendant's evidence denied any negligence on its
part, denied any duty it had to block, denied that it had
blocked, denied doing anything to make plaintiff think
it had blocked, and claimed plaintiff simply unchained
before checking to see if it was safe to do so. Defendant
also put in evidence that plaintiff had antecedent negli·
gence in the first place, by arriving at defendant's yard
with the pipe not then blocked, and improperly chained.
2

1

Damages are not in issue and will not be reviewed.
In greater detail the facts are as follows.
Plaintiff, age 36, at lime of trial, owned a diesel
trador. During November, 1969, he had his unit under
lease as an independent contractor to Harry L. Young
and Sons, a Utah trucking company. (Tr. 160, L23-27).
On November 19, 1969, he drove his tractor, towing
Young's empty 40 foot x 8 foot flat bed trailer, to Flagstaff, Arizona. There he loaded pipe owned by def endant, at defendant's yard, for delivery to defendant's
yard in Salt Lake City. During the trip he was accompanied by his then employee and co-driver, Carl Adkins.
(Tr 242, L27-30).
stacks of pipe were loaded on the trailer, as
a front and a rear tier. Plaintiff was injured by the
front tier. The rear tier is important for the kind of
blocks used, and the work required to unload it.
'l'\','O

The rear tier is illustrated below. It had 28 pieces
of 12" diameter steel pipe, in lengths of 16 to
feet,
and weighing 750 to 1,000 pounds each. (Tr 164, Ll5HJ; 371, L 12-24; 47 5, L25-476, L7). These were laid
on 8 foot long, 4" x 4" timbers, referred to as "blocks"
or "dunnage." Each block had an upright piece of wood
nailed to it at either end. (Ex 4-P; Tr 179, L9-14).
The blocks were not nailed to the trailer bed. (Tr 179,
L 1\:l-21). The tier was secured by three heavy steel
chains thrown over the pipe.
The diagrams in this brief were prepared by counsel
for illustration. At the trial a 40" x s" scale model of
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the trailer with its load of pipe (Ex 4-P), an actual
chain (Ex 4-P-A), and binder (Ex 4-P-B), were received in evidence, so diagrams were not needed, nor
used at the trial.
The front tier of pipe consisted of three pieces of
4;( diameter pipe, 16 to 22 feet in length, and averaging
about two tons each, and four pieces of the 12" pipe.
(Tr 164, Ll5-19; 308, L4-10; Ex 4-P). Blocks were
placed by plaintiff and defendant's yard men along,
and parallel to, the edge of the trailer, two pieces of
the 42" pipe set down on the bed, then the four pieces
of 12" pipe pyramided in between them. Plaintiff
passed a single chain, ref erred to as a "belly wrap" or
''gut chain" over the center, securing it to the metal
trailer bed edges. He then tightened this chain with
a binder placed on top of the right side 42" pipe. The
load was as wide as the trailer bed. The binder was
placed on top of the pipe, rather than on the side, so it
would not protrude out beyond the load, which would
be contrary to trucking regulations. (Tr 170, LI0-15;
214. Ll8-25). The last 42" pipe was then laid on top
of this base. Its weight, pushing down on the belly wrap,
pulled the bottom two pieces of large pipe tightly against
the 12" pieces, making the whole load "suck together,"
and be taut and safe for travel on the road. Two chains
were then passed over the full front tier, one at either
encl, tightened by binders, and the load was ready for
trayel. (Tr 169, LIO - 171, L7; 244, L7 - 245, L22;
255, Ll4-30).
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Plaintiff removed the blocks that had held the
iront tier during loading, before he started on the road.
This was a judgment call. He felt the load was secure.
The only available blocks were lengths of 4" x 4".
Due to the overhang of the 42" pipe, it was difficult to
reaeh under it, to nail these blocks securely to the trailer
bed. The tier was bound to have some motion on the
road, and plaintiff was afraid a block might come loose
and be a road hazard. (Tr 171, LI5-28; 235, L24 - 236,
LIO; 245, L23-28; 249, L5-9; 250, LIS-22).

A binder consists of two short lengths of chain with
hooks at either end, and a throw piece, or handle, in
the center.
Wheu the handle is closed down, it locks in place.
(Ex 4-P-A). A "cheater pipe," about 3 feet long, may
be used to slip over the binder handle and thus give
leverage to lock the binder tight, or release it, when
1t is under chain tension. The binder hooks are set
between links of the main chain. Then, using the cheater
pipe for leverage, the binder handle is pushed down
to a locked position. In the process, the chain is pulled
a few inches tighter.
To make the chain taut, the
process may be repeated if there is any slack left, by
resetting the binder hooks farther out in the chain links.
The spare chain lies loose between the binder hooks
\1 lien the binder is fully set, and it acts itself as a piece
of the chain. (Tr 165, LIO - 166, Ll2; 256, L5 - 257,
19).
The binder is a two step safety device. On releasing
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lrnndle, the unit opens up a few inches, but the hooks
are still in the chain, so that the load is held and cannot
l',cape until the second step, removing a hook from
tlie ehain link, is taken. (Tr I86, LI - I87, LI; 265,
1.18-25; 311, L26 - 3I2, L2). Under the fact and load
,ituation in this case, all witnesses agreed that the
Ginder handle, then the binder hook, couldn't be unrlone by hand, unless the load was blocked to relieve
the chain tension. ( Pltf I84, L28 - I85, L30; I87,
L»-9· 191 L20-27· 192 LI7 - 193 L7· 227 L9-I2·
- ' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
James Johnson, 265, LI8 - 266, L5; 266, L25-28; 267,
7-10. Hay Bethers, 292, L29 - 293, LI8. Howard
llowen, 310, L25 - 311, L2I. Carl Adkins, 256, L5 237, LH. Dale Reese, 337, L3-13. Glen Murray, 474,
1:28 - 475, L19).
tht

Plaintiff introduced testimony of four expert witnesses, Carl Adkins, (Tr 247, Ll8-21; 248, L4-7, James
Johnson, (Tr 262, LI2-I4), Ray Brethers, (Tr 28I,
112 - 282, L5), and Howard Bowen, (Tr 308, Lll-23),
that blocks can be a road hazard, and that without them
his load conformed to accepted safety standards in the
industry.
Defendant introduced expert testimony that use
of blocks during travel is safer and preferable as a
matter of industry standards. These witnesses were
Dale Reese, (Tr 329, L27-330, L2), Blair Thomas,
(Tr 341, L4-7), and Levier Stoddard, (Tr 439, L22HO, LU). Defendant's main witness on this point,
Dale Reese, testified that the block should be 8" x 8"
'\'l'arlles" cut out, or curved, on their inner surface, to
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cradle the pipe. (Tr 329, LS-12; 334, LIS - 335, 13).
These were not supplied by defendant to plaintiff. How.
ever, Blair Thomas agreed with plaintiff that blocks
need not be used on the road, if the load is securely
chained, and that blocks do come loose and create road
hazards (Tr 352, L28 - 353, L25). Levier Stoddard
agreed that the blocks defendant supplied would be
difficult to nail properly for the road trip (Tr 441,
L29 - 443, L9) .
Testimony from the experts on both sides agreed
that the trucker supplies his own chains and binders,
but the shipper, and then receiver, supply any necessary
blocking, because a trucker hasn't the storage space to
carry all the various kinds of dunnage any given load
might require. (James Johnson, Tr 270, L7-13; Ray
Bethers, Tr 283, L9-15; Levier Stoddard, Tr 438, 117·
22; 441, LI8-21).
He testified that the established, acceptable prac·
tices in the trade during unloading, on a very common
sense and standard basis, were that the trucker handles
and protects his own equipment, i.e., chains, binders and
truck; the yard supplies and handles its own equipment,
ie, the load, placement of the load where and how it
wants it, and handles all necessary dunnage and block·
ing; the yard has its own teamwork worked out and
so does the unloading. If the yard is shorthanded the
trucker will assist to expedite matters; that heavy equip·
ment is involved with its hazards during unloading, so
close teamwork is habitual, and each person customarily
relies on the other.

10
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1

ln each of these points he was confirmed by his
m\ill expert witnesses. (Carl Adkins, Tr 247, L22 - 248,
17; Tr 259, LIS - 260, LIO. James Johnson, Tr 263,
LR-:n; 205, L8-12. Ray Bethers, Tr 281 , L3-10·, 283 ,
L.'5-8; 289, LS-14; 291, Ll-6; 292, 3-16). In regard
relying on teamwork, rather than questioning it,
Howard Bowen gave a clear reason: "A. If you was
to a
a question of that sort, you would get the crane
11perator or the fork-lift operator, whatever, angry at
right to start with and might create even a more
dangerous situation which pipe is already dangerous.
So I would assume that he knew what he was doing
right to start with.

Q 1\nd if you discussed blocking then as a standard

practit:e in the trade in the yard and they agree to
block it-

Thal would be about the same thing." (Tr 324, L210).
Defendant's experts also agreed essentially to these
trade practices. (Dale Reese, T 331, L23-332, L21).
Blair Thomas, (Tr 354, LlS-26).
Defendant's three employees testified that the yard
had no duty to block during unloading, that this was
the responsibility of the trucker. However, on cross,
Krnt Thomas admitted that the yard's job was to do
e1erything except unchain. (Tr 363, L 19 -364, L2),
and Glen Murray, while continually denying the yard's
rt:sponsihilities, admitted as true the following testimony
from his deposition:

11

"Q But other than unchaining the load and posi.
tioning the truck, his responsibility was-the rest of the
responsibility was yours, and your employees.
"A Yes, that is right." (Tr 477, L22-27).
"Q And do you assume responsibility for the supervision of the unloading the pipe?
"A Yes." (Tr 478, Lll-14).
Defendant also introduced testimony that plaintiff
had antecedent negligence by chaining the front tier improperly, in that he should have had two belly wraps,
one at either end of the tier, in addition to the two chans '
over the whole tier. (Tr 440, L30 - 441, LIO; 451, 128- i
452, L 13) . Plaintiff's expert contended that plaintiff
had chained properly, in conformity to accepted standards in the trade, (James Johnson, Tr 262, Ll-14. Ray
Bethers, Tr 281, Ll2 - 282, LIO; 296, LI0-30. Howard
Bowen, Tr 308, Lll-23. Carl Adkins, Tr 253, L25-254,
L2), and got a better "sucking" or tightening effect by
using a single chain at the middle of the pipe rather than
chains at the ends. (Tr 282, Lll-18).
1

Plaintiff and Adkins left Flagstaff on November
20, 1969, arriving at night of that day in Salt Lake City.
The trip was without incident, and the load secure. Ad·
kins went home. (Tr 17 4, L9-24) . On November 21,
1969, plaintiff, alone, drove to defendant's yard, arriving
at 10:00 to 10:30 am. (Tr 17.5, Ll-22; 176, Lll-14).
Defendant's bookkeeper, Kent Thomas, directed
plaintiff to park by defendant's crane, and unloading

12
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,:ommenced. (Tr 356, Ll-18). Glen .Murray, yard superintendent, and a director of defendant corporation, operated the crane during unloading. The tractor and
trader were parked facing south on the west side of the
crane. (Ex 1-P, Lopez; D-2, l\Iurray; and D-3,
Thomas).
Plaintiff then undid all chains but the front tier
belly \Hap from the load. (Tr 177, Ll0-15). The rear
tlcr was uuloa<led entirely. This took and hour or more.
Kent Thomas started, with plaintiff helping him. After
about 15-minutes of work, Richard Lopez, defendant's
employee, arrived at the yard and took over for Kent
Thomas, who returned to the yard office. The accident
happened about 45 minutes later. (Tr 356, L29 - 357,
14). These four men, l\Iurray, Thomas, Lopez and
plaintiff, were the only people in the yard from plaintiffs arrival until his accident.
The unloading procedure was that the crane would
swing its boom over the pipe, lower "slings," which are
chains with hooks in their ends, to the pipe, the yardmaH would set the hooks in the pipe ends, the crane
would lift the pipe up, swing it around, and lower it onto
a stock pile east of the trailer. Plaintiff, at the stock pile,
would release the hooks, and the boom then swing back
lo the truck for the next piece. (Tr 177, Ll 7 - 178, L19).
From here forward, the disagreements are irreconeila ble, as the parties told diamentrically opposed stories
about the unloading.
'l'he ideal Statement of Facts is not argumentative.

13

Here, it must to some degree, because defendant'.i
ts gave.
and improbable testimony.
Ihe contradictions, and their inferences, have to be set
forth to correctly state the facts.
Plaintiff claimed negligence on defendant's parl '
only during the unloading in Salt Lake City. (Com.
plaint, para. 3, Tr 1; Instr. 16, Tr 60; Instr. 17, Tr 61).
The jury found against defendant. The evidence should
be reviewed, consistent with that verdict.
This does not mean that the jury verdict against
plaintiff will be ignored. Plaintiff conceded acts of hi1
own antecedent to defendant's blocking the pipe during
unloading - by his manner of chaining and by removing
the front tier blocks before travelling, - and then, after
defendant had blocked, admitted not personally inspecting the blocking. The jury might have found plaintiff
negligent on any of these grounds, and the evidence will
also be considered consistent with that finding.
Plaintiff testified that during unloading of the rear
tier and two breaks, - one when the crane had to be
gassed, and the other when the crane was moved up to
the front tier of pipes, - he worked together with de·
f endant' s men and talked with all of them about the man·
ner of unloading the front tier. It was agreed that de·
fendant would block it and use the crane to unload it.
(Tr 178, L25 - 179, L2; 180, L24-30; 179, L25-30; 227,
Ll6 - 228, L24; 240, Ll8-25).

When the work started on the front tier, Mr. Lo·
pez set the sling hooks in the top 42" pipe, and it was

14
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;w1mg to the stock pile. The way was now clear to release the belly wrap. Plaintiff crawled upon the rear of
the trailer, walked to the remaining pipe, and asked if
1t mts safe to undo his binder. Lopez told him it was.
(Tr 182, LS - 18-±, L23; 238, LIO - 239, L25).

Plaintiff was aware that the pipe was under preswre. The 11ncontradicted testimony was that pipe rolls
freely. Like water, stacked pipes seek the lowest level,
ualess contained. The trailer bed was flat. ( Pltf. Tr 168,
Lli - Hi9, LS). Its steel edges were flush with the bed.
(Pltf. Tr H>8, Ll2-26). It offered no impedance to roll
of the pipe. (Carl Adkins, Tr 257, Ll0-14. James Johnson, Tr 265, L:W - 266, L28; 267, L7-10. Howard Bowen, Tr 311, L2-5, Ex. 18-D). The four 12" pipes had
been PFamicled between the two -±2" pipes for the express purpose of exerting pressure on them, the pressure
fixing the pipe in a position of outward tension so that
the load would be tight, and not shift, during travel. This
outward pressure of the pipe would keep the "belly
\\1ap" taut at all times, unless it was held by blocks.
The expert witnesses on both sides agreed to the
foregoing including defendant's director and yard boss,
}fr. l\Iurray. (Pltf. Tr 109, LIO- - 171, L7. Carl Adkins, Tr 2M, L21 - 245, L4; 255, Ll4-30; 257, Ll0-14 .
.Tames Johnson, Tr 262, L18 - 263, L7. Ray Bethers,
Tr 2\l.J., Ll2 - 30; 298; L13-23. Dale Reese, Tr 332, Ll.521; R37, La-rn. Glen Murray, Tr 474, L28 - 475, L19).
When plaintiff got to the belly wrap, he saw that there
was slack in it, and in the binder chains, indicating the
pipes "ere being held by something beside the chain.
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Removing the top 42" pipe, which had pushed the chain
down, would produce this slack, if the pipe were blocked.
If not blocked, then the remaining pipe would spread ,
out, use up this slack, and the belly wrap chain be taut
agam.
Because the trailer bed was chest height above the
ground, and the binder on top of the pipe above that,
plaintiff had to kneel on the west, right side, piece of 42"
pipe itself, to reach the binder. It could not be reached
from the ground. (Tr 459, L30-460, LIO).
Plaintiff released the binder handle with his right
hand with no difficulty, and no need to use his cheater
pipe. He then waited, but the load did not move out to
take up the few more inches of slack this allowed. Plaintiff then shifted his weight leaning out to his right, the
west, and undid the binder hook with his hand. As he
released it, the pipe he was on rolled west and went off
the trailer. As it moved under him, plaintiff jumped
clear of the pipe going backward and out. He landed on
the ground with such force that he shattered weight
bearing bones at the joints of his left knee and right
ankle, causing permanent injuries, but scrambled clear
of the pipe itself, which came to a stop when all slack in
the belly wrap was used up.
During its case, defendant's agents denied plaintiff
ever discussed blocking or that they talked to plaintiff
at all except to tell him where to spot his load, (Kent
Thomas, Tr 358, L2-5. Richard Lopez, Tr 375, LI-9:
377, Ll4-21. Glen Murray, Tr 448, LI-5), and also
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11lien Kenl Thomas came out to give plaintiff a message
from Harry Young and Sons, shortly before the accident. (Tr 157, Lo-13). On cross, Glen Murray admitted
that in his deposition he swore he couldn't have talked
lo plaintiff because of the noise of his crane, but in truth
lie had conversations while there. (Tr 479, Ll2 - 480,
Ll!J). Defendant's employee, Mr. Lopez, also admitted
that in his deposition when asked about the eontent of his
comersatiou with plaintiff concerning blocking of the
front tier of pipe, that he answered, "I don't remember,"
in rnntrast to his denial at trial that they discussed the
matter at all. (Tr 375, Ll-9; 411, L25 - 412, L14). Mr.
Lopez also agreed that unloading works best and fastest
11ith two men besides the crane operator, (Tr 384, L25 385, L 1; 430, L23 - 431, L4). He flatly testified on direct that plaintiff did not help him at all. On cross, after
being reminded of his deposition, he admitted that he
'didn't remember" if plaintiff hadn't worked with him.
(Tr 082, Lo-18).

Carl Adkins testified that plaintiff acted pursuant
to trade customs in relying on defendant's statement, as
testified to hy plaintiff, (Tr 184, Ll-23), that the load
was blocked, without checking this himself, saying either
way would be acceptable. (Tr 254, L28 - 255, Ll3). He
\\as confirmed in this team reliance custom by plaintiff's
1Jthcr witnesses. (James Johnson, Tr 268, LI0-15; 274,
L20 23. Ray Bethers, Tr 283, L5-8; 289, L8-14; 291,
Ll-r\, 202, L3-16. Howard Bowen, Tr 309, L22 - 310,
T, 1:3; :31 !l, L 18 . :321, L30) . On this important point he
11 ;1, a Iso confirmed
defendant's witness, Blair
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Thomas. (Tr 354, L3-26). Levier Stoddard said ht
would block himself, and use a hammer to make sure the
block was tight. (Tr 440, L 19-29). Dale Reese
equivocal on the point. (Tr 335, L16-336, L7).
Defendant denied it did any actual blocking. It
alleged through all three of its men, that there was a
single, nailed down block on the east side of the trailer
still in place after the accident, that it must have arrived
with the load, so they assumed plaintiff had blocked the
west side too beforehand. (Richard Lopez, Tr 379, 11518. Kent Thomas, Tr 362, L29 - 363, LL Glen Murray,
Tr 448, L26-30; 450, Ll8-22; 460, Ll8-22).
Each of the three men gave up this position on crossexamination.

Mr. Thomas, then admitted that there was a block
on the east side, that he personally checked it after the
accident and saw no nail in it. (Tr 367, LB-30). Mr. ,
Lopez said he also examined the blocks carefully after
the accident, and that there were "several" blocks there,
not just one, (Tr 402, L5-17), but no nails. (Tr 421.
Lll - 422, Ll3). Mr. Murray, the director, had testified ,
very strongly, that plaintiff arrived with a single, nailed •
down, block and that he remembered this "absolutely, I
am sure," because he personally removed it with his
crowbar. (Tr 450, L8-12; 462, Ll3 - 463, L4). But on
cross-examination, he admitted that in his deposition he
testified that there was a row of blocks, not a single one
along the east side, and that he personally removed none
of them. (Tr 463, L 15-27; 465, L30 - 468, L29).
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On the west side of the trailer, where the pipe rolled,
all defendants testified that there were no blocks near
the trailer on the ground, nor on the trailer after the aceident. (llichard Lupez, Tr 379, L4-14; 402, L2-4; LllKent Thomas, Tr 362, L25 - 3G3, LI. Glen Murray,
Tr-1<50, L5-12; 464, L8-19; 465, L8-10; 471, LS-28). It
should be noted that the rear tier blocks were distinctive
because of upright pieces nailed to both ends of each
block. Mr. Lopez denied he had ever been on the west
side of the trailer at all before the accident, so couldn't
have put a block against the pipe there. On cross-examination, he admitted that in his deposition he said he'd
been on the west side, "a few times" before the accident.
(Tr 42G, L13 - 427, L7). Mr. Murray admitted that in
his deposition he testified that there were "gobs" of
blocks on the ground by the trailer on its west side after
the accident. (Tr 465, Lll-23).
Officer \¥ abel, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff,
was called to the scene after the accident. He found a
plain 8 foot 4 x 4 block hvo feet from the west side of the
trailer. If plaintiff had arrived from Arizona with nailed
<lown blocks and this was one, it would have had nails
in it. It didn't. (Tr 495, L6-14).
On review there is actually no conflict of evidence
on this point. Plaintiff and Carl Adkins testified that
there were no nailed blocks during the trip. (Tr 240,
L 7-1 7) . Glen Murray said there were because he remo...-• ·d one nailed on the east side. However, his testimon>' is no stronger than his cross-examination, and he
aclrnitted as accurate his deposition testimony that there
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was not a single nailed block, so his testimony actually
supported plaintiff, as did that of Kent Thomas and .Mr.
Lopez, on cross-examination.
The fair inference from these contradictions of de.
fendant is that it was not willing to admit actually
blocking, so it claimed plaintiff blocked before he ar.
rived .
.Mr. lVIurray testified that he watched plaintiff undo
the binder, and that plaintiff just flipped its handle
loose with one hand, and then undid the binder hook by
hand without waiting to see if the pipe would move. His
purpose was obviously to show plaintiff was impetuous
and negligent, but actually served to confirm that the
pipe was blocked. Mr. Murray then admitted, on cross,
that this couldn't be done, due to pipe pressure on the
chain, unless the pipe was held, so as to let the chain go
slack. (Tr 474, L28 - 475, L19).
The testimony referred to before, was already in,
that releasing the binder handle, then watching the
pipe for motion and the chain for slack, and only then
undoing the binder hook was an accepted way to un·
chain. (James Johnson, Tr 265, LIS-25. Howard Bow·
en, Tr 311, L26-29). A block not tightly wedged could
move a bit as the pipe leaned into it, and then, being in
motion keep on sliding. Tight wedging would be diffi·
cult to determine visually. The two step unchaining is a
surer, and trade accepted, test of adequate blocking.
(James Johnson, Tr 274, Lll-19).
Finally, Mr. Lopez testified that he didn't see plain·
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tiff during the time immediately before the accident
while plaintiff was undoing the binder, (Tr 377, Lll-24;
L7-21), and that he, Lopez, didn't even know where
the binder was. (Tr 427, L 13-17). He admitted on crossexamination that in his deposition he drew a diagram accurately locating the binder, (Tr 427, Ll5 - 420, L4),
and that he also deposed, that as the accident laappened,
he was watching plaintiff "messing" with the belly wrap
rhain. (Tr 424, L20 - 425, L 13) .
At the time the accident occurred, Mr. Lopez testi-

fied that he had been returning to the truck with the
erane slings in his hand, but had stopped, and been
chatting for 1 to 3 minutes with Kent Thomas. (Tr 402,
126 - 402, L2; 431, L5 - 432, Ll7). At the same time,
Mr. Murray says he was watching plaintiff undo the
binder. Tr 451, L3-27). If the load wasn't then blocked,
and Lopez knew it wasn't and plaintiff wasn't up doing
his share of the work by handling his chains, there is the
factual picture of a laborer and office clerk just standing chatting, doing nothing, while their boss just sits and
waits saying nothing, with his hands on his crane controls, for them to go back to work. The inference can
only be, as the jury must have found, that defendant's
men had blocked, and knew it, and they were standing
around, because it was plaintiff's job that was then being
done, and until he released the belly chain, no more pipe
could be unloaded. From this, because it was their job
to handle blocking before unchaining, it is obvious that
they had already done it.
At a certain point, contradictions go beyond argu-
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ment, and pro\·e facts. Here, as a matter of fact, ii' thL
accident didn't happen just as plaintiff said it <lid, and
defendant's stories were true, \vhy did they conflict so'
Defendant denied the duty to block. It denied an agreement to block by denying any cmwersation with plaintiff. It elaime<l plaintiff had alrea<ly blocke<l in Arizona.
It claimed the pipe was unblocked, and that no block wa 1
on or near the 'vest side of the trailer. Asi<le from tht
fact that these last two points are self-contradictory, each
of these points was overcome by the weight of evidence.
the physics of force, and defendant's own admissions on
cross-examination, leaYing defendant in a position where
it really has no version of the facts at all.
The actual cause of the accident is clear based on
known, or a<lequately lH'oven, facts. All blocks on the
front tier had been removed before leaving Arizona.
After the accident there was at least one 4" x 4" x 8 foot
block wedge, without nails, on the east side of the pipe.
It held, and the pipe did not move in that direction. On
the west side there was no block on the trailer, but an 8
foot long 4 x 4 was on the ground, two feet from the
trailer. This block had held the load when the top pipt
was removed. The remaining pipe remained stationar)·
and the belly 'nap became slack. There is no other
source, in the record, that could have held the pipe. Thr
belly wrap stayed ::;Jack while plaintiff undid the binder
by hand. '\Then he
ted his weight out to remove thr
hinder book, the pipe rnlled. The witnesses said that
under the fad situation, the
possible explanation
"·as that the pipe ha<l to be blocked, but the block W:l'

22

not set adequately, and the shift outwards of plaintiff's
weight was enough extra force to let the pipe move the
block. (Ray Bethers, Tr 300, Lao - 301, L 15. Howard
Bowen, Tr 312, L3 - 313, Ll2).
Glen Murray did say "a little bit of dirt" could hold
the pipe. (Tr 476, L26-28). None of his witnesses supported him on this.

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 19
WAS IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY OVERSTATING THE CONCEPTS OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
The trial court submitted Instruction 19 to the jury.
The Instruction, set forth as follows, was intended to
advance the theory of contributory negligence:
The law does not permit one negligent person
to recover against another negligent person where
the negligence of each proximately contributed
to cause the accident. This is true even though
one is more negligent than the other. In other
words, the degree of negligence on the part of one
cannot be conddered by you where both are negligent and if the negligence of each proximately
contributed in any degree to cause the accident,
then neither can recover but the law will leave
them to bear their own losses.
Therefore, if you find from the evidence that
the plaintiff, Arthur Rowley, was negligent in
any respect claimed by defendant, and that his
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negligence provimately contributed to c:ausin,
the
then y,uu should answer
Nu. 3 yes m the Special Verdict. (Tr P.
(emphasis added) .
·
Tu illmtrnte the errors of Instruction 19, which an
cumulative in effect and will all Le discussed in thi1
single point, certain of the salient facts should be sei
forth. Accordingly, the facts will be viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict. Cottrell v. Grand
Union 1.'ea Co., 5 U 2d 187, 299 P.2d 187, ( 1956). The
verdict of the jury indicated that the defendant was ·
guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to ;
the injury and that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence which proximately contributed to his own
injury. (Trl09).
First, analyzing the jury's finding of defendant)
negligence, it is important to note plaintiff's testimony.
It is uncontradicted by defendant that without some kind •
of blocking, the binder could not be easily released, and i
in fact the binder handle was easily lifted, (Tr 47 4, 128·
4<7 5, L 19), the pipe did not roll, and there was slack in
the chain at that point. (Tr 187, L2-9; 191, L20-27; 190.,
Ll-7). The jury was therefore constrained to beliere'
that the pipe "·as blocked on the west side and the fur·
ther conclusion is that the jury disbelieved defendant'i
testimony that 1t did not do the blocking. Plaintiff's onl)·
claim of. cldendant's negligence is that it blocked the
pipe, but nnproperly. In finding defendant guilty ol
negligence tl1e only logical conclusion is that the jun
beliend plaintiff i.e., defendant blocked negligently.
!
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Next, careful analysis of the jury's finding of plaintiff's contributory negligence must be made. During
trial, defendant made several claims of plaintiff's negligence: ( 1) in failing to maintain blocks during travel to
defendant's yard and not having them nailed and in
place already at the time of unloading; (2) in improperly chaining down the load in the first place so that it
would have been allegedly unnecessary for plaintiff to
himself to danger in unloading; (3) that plaintiff had an absolute duty to check the blocking himself
without any alternative method available, e.g., relying
upon the yardmen' s assurances or other standards of the
trade as to the utilization of teamwork; nor by testing
the load by using the binder in stages; and ( 4) in climbing upon the load and undoing the security chains in total
disregard of whether the pipe was blocked or not.
The jury found plaintiff to be contributorily negligent in one of these areas.
It is in defendant's first two claims of plaintiff's
negligence that Instruction 19 becomes irretrievably mis-

leading and confusing. The facts, upon which defendant
claimed plaintiff negligent fall into two utterly distinct
groups-the first two being antecedent to, and remote
from, the third and fourth. The two groups are clearly
separated by defendant's intervening act of undertaking
to block the pipe, which the jury found to be negligently
performed. The problem therefore is broadened to one
of not only ascertaining negligence, but also proximate
cause, which the facts in this case disclose to be crucial.
25

Plaintiff <loes not admit and concedes only for the
purpose of argument in this brief, that he was negligent
in his performance of any of the first two areas of negligence defendant claimed, and specifically denies any
negligence in the latter two.
·
The intial error in instruction 19 lies in the area ·Ji
negligence. The lnstruclion states that "the degree ui
negligence on the part of one or the other cannot be considered by you where both are negligent ... "
"\Ve here observe that the phrases 'to anv extent,' 'however slight,' and 'in any
are ,
usually used as argumentative phrases in request- :
ed jury instructions attempting to emphasize the
duty of the parties against whom directed, and
that it is ill-advised to refer to them in instruction.1
even tthen theu refer to neuligence." Diviner.
Cook, 3 U 2d 134, 14(1, 279 P.2d 1073, (1955)
(Emphasis adde<l)

The negligence test given, in effect, is like an "any
degree" test. It can lead the jury as easily to find any '
degree of imperfect conduct constitutes negligence, as
that negligence, within the broad variables of reasonable
human conduct, ean be very slight. It is not claimed that
the language used co11cerning the degree of negligence
is error per se, but only that it tends to eonfuse, and ag·
gravates the more serious errors, now to be discussed.
The instruction then continues, " ... and if the neg·
liuence of each pro,rimately contribute in ony degree to
b
"(
cause the accident, then neither can recover. . . . elll·
phasis added) .
This is prejudicial error.
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The plaintiff's negligent exposure of himself to
<langer or his failure to exercise reasonable care
for his
protection is a legally contributing
came of his harm if, but only if, it is a substantial
factor in bringing about his harm. Rest. of Torts,
§465 cited in Cox v. Thompson, 123 U 81, 254
P.2d 1047 at 1051; Divine v. Cook, 3 U 2d 134,
at 145.
Our court and courts of other states have considered the use of the words such as "to any extent," "however slight," or "in any degree," may
qualif.IJ negligence, but not proximate cause. Divine v. Cook, 279 P.2d at 1073. (emphasis added).
Standing alone, Instruction 10, the court's only definition of proximate cause, is correct: it is the " ... cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces an injury and
without which the result would not have occurred ...."
(Tr 53) . Instruction 19 contradicts Instruction 10 and
has the effect of belittling Instruction !O's definition.
Nute Taylor v. Johnson, 15 U 2d 342, 393 P.2d 382,
(19641), an automobile collision case involving the issue
of contributory negligence. It was there held that the
trial court's instructions committed prejudicial error in
emphasizing the instructions in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff, so granted plaintiff a new trial.
The court based its holding, in part, on the impropriety
of a contributory negligence instruction almost identical
to that defendant used in this case:" ... and if the negligence of each proximately contributes in any degree to
eause the accident then neither can recover.... " Citing

27

Julmson v. Lcu:is, 121 U 218, 240 P.2d 498,
Divine 'l'. Cool,., supra; and Ferguson v. Jonysma, lU l
2d 179 at 188, 35 P.2d .J.04; the court commented:

\Ve have criticized it in that it emphasizes thedtgree of negligence required to establish liabilih
against the defendant and suggests that 11;1;
slight ncgligcnce on the part of the injured 11ii!
defeat such liability, which may cause the jury t11
forget that the injured person's negligence will
not defeat a recovery unless the jury finds it \l'a1
a contributing proximate causc of llie accident.
15 U 2d at 348.

Hall v. Blackham, 18 U 2d 1()4, 417 P.2d 6tll.,
( l 9GG), expressly approved a negligence instruction
using the very language plaintiff here requested in ib
discussion in chambers, i.e., "If you find ... that whal
[defendant] Deleeuw did or failed to do contributed in
any substantial degree as a pro,cirnate cause of the col·
lision you should find that Byron Deleeuw was negli- .
gent." 18 U 2d at rn9. (emphasis added). The courthao:
this to say, citing approvingly the Restatement of the '
Law, Torts .J.31, p. 1073 ( 1955); and Divine v. Cook
supra:
From readin(J' the instruction it appears
"substantial"
intended to modify proxima!t
cause, tchich was a correct statement of the /a;.
Negligence that is committed must be a substan·
tial or material factor in bringing about the
or result in order to constitute the prm:1mnt,
cause of the accident. 18 lT 2d 1()4, Hl9. ( ernpha·
sis added).
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The confusion in the phrase "proximately contributes in any degree" is that it is a contradiction of
terms. "Proximate cause" means "substantial" and
"effective" cause. It is irreconcilable contradiction to
try to modify the phrase with "in any degree."
To illustrate-The highest burden of proof is the
criminal law's, "beyond a reasonable doubt." Even so
an instruction saying a reasonable doubt is a "reasonable doubt in any degree," would be in error. The
burden is not that great. Here, in a civil case, plaintiff
is faced twice in one instruct:on with the burden that
the degree of his negligence, and then the degree of
his proximate cause are immaterial, that any degree
will do to defeat him. The burden is too high. An instruction that overstates the duties of a party is error.
Morrison v. Perry, 104 U 151, 140 P 772 .
These are conflicting phrases which, under the facts,
lead the jury to believe that any negligence on plaintiffs part, be it remote and antecedent, or direct and
substantial, would defeat his recovery. The conflict constitutes reversible error because it cannot be told which
instruction with respect to proximate cause the jury
relied upon . .T ensen v. Utah Ry Co., 72 U 366, at 381,
270 P. 349, ( 1928).

The key to understanding the problem is this what plaintiff did prior to arriving in Salt Lake City
has no legal relevance; any negligence on plaintiff's
Part in his loading or travelling to Salt Lake City is
antecedent to, and not legally capable of being, a proxi-
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mate cause of the accident because of defendant's intervening act of blocking the pipe in Salt Lake City. The
situation is congruent with the following analogy: ''A
builds a ladder, the -Uh rung of which is insubstantial
and defective. "A" loans the ladder to "B'', who di·
covers the defect and replaces the 4th rung with another, alas also defective. Upon return of the ladder.
"A" ascends it and is injured when the 4th rung collapses. "B's" negligence in placing the defectin Jtf1
step is the sole proximate cause of ''A's" injury. "A's
defective 4th rung is antecedent to, and no cause of hi\
injury, because of "B's" intervening act which is the
sole, efficient cause of the injury.
As stated in J olmsun v. Len:is Brothers, et al., W
U 218 at 221, "There must be a negligent act, i.e., a11
act which lacks ordinary care; and that such act must
proximately contribute to cause the injury, i.e., it mmt
as a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by au1
new or intervening cause, produce the injury com·
plained of."
In reading Instruction rn, the jury was told to
belien that plaintiffs alleged negligent acts prior tr·
arriving in Salt Lake City could bar his recovery, be
cause they contributed "in any degree," whereas thei
were mere antecedent conditions or attendant circUJll·
stances of the injury. Applied to the facts-if plaintitl
was negligent before he arrived in Salt Lake, it wa·
because the pipe was not safe to unload. Defendan:
superseded that possibility by blocking the pipe. Therr
is only one set of blocks. Defendant installed them. Tni'
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case is a textbook illustration of an intervening cause,
as opposed to two causes that exist simultaneously, or

:ll't:umulate in turn, combining to cause harm.

Hillyard v. Utah Byproducts Co., 1 U 2d 143,
2ll3 P.2d 287 at 292, states the rule clearly where the
failure to act is deemed an intervening, ergo sole, proximate cause:
In applying the test of foreseeability to situations
where a negligently created pre-existing condition combines with a later act of negligence causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clearcut
distinction between two classes of cases. The first
situation is where one has negligently created a
dangerous condition (such as parking the truck)
and a later actor observed, or circumstances are
such that he could not fail to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it. The second situation inrolves conduct of a later intervening actor who
negligently failed to observe the dangerous condition until it was too late to avoid it. In regard to
the first situation it is held as a matter of law that
the later intervening act does interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut off the legal
effect of the negligence of the initial actor. Cited
in McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 U 2d 400, 403,
346 P.2d 711, (1959).

The rationale of the case is no different for a situation
in which an act rather than an omission intervenes to
"cut off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial
actor." In other words, "if it appears that the injury
would have occurred if the plaintiff had not been guilty
of the fault charged against him, a recovery should not
he clenie<l on the ground of contributory negligence ...
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If the plaintiff's negligence affords only an oppvrtunity
or occasion for the injury or a mere condition of it. ;1
is no bar to his action ... " 38 AmJ ur, Negligence, i2I:J,
P. 898. Instruction 19, however, tells the jury otherwise,
that if plaintiff's negligence contributes "in any degree,
he is barred from recovery.

This error is c·ompounded in paragraph 2 of Instruction 19 by inserting the phrase, ''negligent in a1111
respect claimed by defendant," over plaintiff's objection
in chambers.

The case of Everts v. Worrel, 58 U 238, 248, 19i I
1
P. 1034, points out that the court should determine
which issues of negligence are proper for submission
to the jury and that an abstract instruction based on a
party's "claims" of negligence is likely to mislead the·
jury. This proves itself true here, where defendanl
"claimed" antecedent and remote negligence on part of
plaintiff would bar his recovery.
I

We already have the problem that the jury mighl
be misled into using the possible antecedent negligence
as the basis for finding against plaintiff, because of tht ·
any degree of causation test.
Now the court directs the jury to consider negli·
gence in "any respect claimed by defendant". "An.:
respect" has to include all claims of defendant, and thii
puts the jury into antecedent negligence, where 11 .
shouldn't be.
In order for contributory negligence to defeat re·
covery it is true that it need not be the nearest
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in time or place to the effect it produces. However, negligence of plaintiff is not a bar:
... if it did not so contribute that, but for such
negligence the injury would not have occurred
or if the injury is not a natural and probable consequence of such negligence, or if the injury is
due tu an independent intervening cause for
which defendant is responsible, or if the negligence is unrelated to Phe cause or causes of the
accident, or if such negligence is merely an antecedent occasi,on, condition, or attendant circumstance of the in.jury. 65A CJS, Negligence, §129,
p. 99.
The aged case of Gorman-Gamill Drug Co. v. Watkins,
64 So. 350, 185 Ala. 653 ( 1914), illustrates the error
of an instruction allowing the jury to find a plaintiff
contributorily negligent for negligent acts "claimed
by defendant," acts unrelated to the cause or merely
antecedent conditions or occasions attending the circumstances of the injury. In Gorman, plaintiff, a dairyman, sued the defendant druggist alleging that defendant negligently delivered five pounds of common salt
in lieu of the same quantity of Epsom Salts, as plaintiff
had ordered, and in administering the common salt to
plaintiff's cow, defendant's negligence caused the cow's
death. The court ruled that, the evidence showing plaintiff to be acutely sensitive to the distinction between
Epsom salt and common salt, that he was contributorily
negligent. The rubric of the holding is, however, critical
to the instant case:
The ordinary conduct of rational beings must
be goyerned by common prudence and common
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sense, and he who fails in this cannot justly charg(
ills .that follow to the antecedent and remote
fault of
albeit su_ch remote fault supplie.,
the conditwn without winch vhe injury wo·uld not
have .occurred. 64 So. 350, 351; also see J ohnsou
v Prunm,. 396 P.2d 426, 74 N.M. 597, (19641
(Emphasis added.)
This error is, of course, multiplied when joimd
with the "any degree' phrase. Now the jury is to!G
that plaintiff is contributorily negligent if his negligence
"proximately contributes in any degree" and that tht,
negligence which must bar his recovery is that which
"in any respect claimed by defendant" provides thh
contribution. At this point the jury is now dealing with
the remote, "philosophical", and "metaphysical" cause;
of the injury which they are told must bar his recovery.
This falls far short of the "substantial factor" test recom·
mended by the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 2na,
§430, P.428 and the requirements of Utah law on the
subject, specifically Divine v. Cook, supra.
The effect of conflicting instructions, and of cumu·
lative errors is covered in detail in Point II, and is per·
tinent also to Point I.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO
20 HOLDS PLAINTIFF TO AN ERRONEOm·
LY HIGH STANDARD OF CARE IN REQUIR
ING HIM "TO DISCOVER ANY OBSERY.
ABLE H.A.ZARDS IN UNLOADING THE PIPE
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FROM THE TRAILER" AND ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF NO ALTERNATIVE TO THIS
REQUIREMENT, AND IN OMITTING PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Instruction 20, (Tr 63) :
Arthur Rowley was under a duty at all times to
exercise such reasonable care for his own safety
as an ordinary prudent person would have done
under the circumstances-to discover any observable hazards in unloading the pipe from the trailer and to take such precautions as a reasonably
prudent person would take under the same or similar circumstances against injury. The amount of
caution required for that duty varies in direct proportion to the dangers known or reasonably to be
apprehended or anticipated in connection with
the work. The failure of Arthur Rowley to use
reasonable care for his own safety would constitute contributory negligence. (emphasis added).
This instruction deals with plaintiff's duty to use
due care for his own safety.
Counsel for plaintiff strenuously objected to this
instrncton on the grounds that it was one sided toward
defendant, it takes away from plaintiff his right to rely
on defendant's assurances that it had blocked, and it
takes away his right to rely on standards in the trade,
by requiring plaintiff "to discover any observable hazards" in unloading the pipe from the trailer.
The court and counsel discussed the instructions
at length in chambers, before they were given to the
jury. These objections were made in detail then.
35

Through inadvertence the instruction was overloukt<
during the formal exceptions.

t

The court did have notice of these exceptions prio
to the time for giving of the instructions. The purpoit
of taking exceptions is so that the court can corret:
itself. This purpose was fully met. URCP 51; Hili:
Cloward, H U 2d 55, 377 P .2d 186, ( 1965); illcCiri
v. Kendrick, 2 U 2d 364, 274 P. 962, (1954); Divin:
v. Cook, supra, 3 U 2d at 149; State v. Hines, 307
877, 6 U 2d 126 at 132, ( 1957).

\

o

}"'rom the evidence, there is a jury question as t,,
whether plaintiff was negligent, after arriving in dt;
fendant's yard, because he did not check visually defena,
ant's blocking before he unchained the pipe. As stalec
in Point I, the jury rejected defendant's contenticr,
that it didn't block the pipe. The question,
was still open as to whether plaintiff acted reasonabl,1.
in relying on trade customs, defendant's assuranrb
that it had blocked, and his alternate safety procedurt
of looking for slack chain, when he unchained the pipe:

c:

d
n

1

The error in Instruction 20 lies in taking their
issues from the jury.
The question of contributory negligence is
judged, not alone on what plaintiff did or did not do
but also by conjoining facts pertaining to what in wa:
of legal duty plaintiff had the right to expect of
ant." 65 CJ S ,Negligence, §118 ( 2), p.38, footnoteJ·
Numerous traffic cases, notably involving intersfl
tion accidents, recognize that where circumstances indi·
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cate that one owes a duty to another, it is error to say
that it is negligence to fail to anticipate that the duty
1roul<l or may be breached. Beck v. Jeppesen, 262 P.2d
itiO. 1 U 2d 127 at 130, ( 1953) ; Bates v. Burns, 3 U
zd 180, 281 P.2d 209, ( 1955); Williams v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Inst., 6 U 2d 283, 312 P.2d 564,
(1957).

"It is their (the jury's) province to note the special
circumstances and surroundings of each particular case,
and then say whether the conduct of the parties in that
case was such as would be expected of reasonable, prudent men under a similar state of affairs." Hone v. Mammoth Mining Co., 27 U 168, 75 P. 381at384 (1904).
Applying this rationale to the case at hand, the
error in Instruction 20 can be seen in the fact that,
under its language, plaintiff had no right to rely on defendant living up to its legal duties; it said he had to
himself personally check the blocking. If a person cannot reasonably rely on duties owed him by others, duties
have no value, and a person would not dare do most
of his daily activities, such as relying on the duty of
other drivers to stay on their side of the road. As stated
in Johnson v. Lewis Brothers, supra, where an instruction sets too high a standard, it tends to direct a verdict
and is error.
Had Instruction 20 stated that Arthur Rowley,
in order to be free from contributory negligence could
do one of two things, either personally "discover any
hazards in unloading the pipe from the
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trailer," or, in the alternathe, "to take such precauti1111 ,
as a reasonably prudent person would take under tn
same or similar circumstances,'' the Instruction wouk
be correct. It is not alternative. It is cmnulatin .. \.
the Instruction reads it gave plaintiff the singular, t:'
qualified, and mandatory duty to check the load hi 111
self. Obviously, by his own admission that he did 1w.
visually check the load for "observable hazards," tu1
jury had no alternative under the instructiou but ti
find plaintiff contributorily negligent. ''Vhile his co11
duct might meet the first test of the instruction-whicn ,
was reasonable conduct, it could not meet the seconu •
test - of personally discovering all hazards. The la11
requires the first test. The second is too severe a stanJ,'
ard.

Morrison v. Pcrr,11, 104 U 151, 140 P 772, is i11
point. The court instructed the jury that both driver,
had a duty to keep a "constant lookout." This was heiil)
error, because it exaggerated the true duty of keepin; !I
a "reasonable lookout." The matter of two instruction1 ·
one good and one in error, is also dealt with in
v. Perry, supra, because the court also instructed tha'.
the parties only had a duty to keep a "careful lookout '
The Supreme Court said, "These instructions were con·
flicting and the giving of such instructions constitute!
error. Sorensen v. Bell, 51 U 262, 170 P. 72."
Instruction 22 (Tr 64) is the only other instructiuu
dealing with the topics of plaintiff's duty to use dw
care for his own safety, and to look for hazards. It
a perfectly• baood instruction, stating:
1
'
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A person who is exercising due care has a right
to assume that others will also perform their duties, and he has a right to rely and act on that assumption unless, in the exercise of reasonable care,
he observes or should observe something to warn
him to the contrary. In the absence of any such
warning, it is not negligence for a person to fail
to anticipate injury which can come to him onl)
from a violation of law or violation of duty by
another.
However, one is not justified in ignoring obvious danger although it is created by another's
misconduct, nor is he ever excused from exercising ordinary care.
The two instructions are in direct conflict and Instruction 20 goes farther in two respects. First, it deals
specirieally with unloading hazards, and Instruction
is general. Second, because it ends with a final sentence, "The failure of Arthur Rowley to use due care
for his own safety would constitute contributory negligcuce.'' There is no reference here to causation at all.
Simply the act in itself constitutes contributory negligence.
This is the reverse, but analogous, to the situation
in Johnson v. Lewis Brothers, supra, where an instruction stated "contributory negligence is any act or omission which in any manner ... " The omission of "negligent" before "act or omission" was held prejudicial
trror, because contributory negligence has two absolute
components-negligence and causation. In Instruction
22, cansation is omitted and this is error of the same
txact magnitude as omitting "negligence" in Johnson
i
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Instruction 22 has no reference at all to proximate
cause, so it cannot balance out the cumulative error of
Instruction 20-that plaintiff has "to discover any observable haz.ard" or he is not using "reasonable care for
his own safety," and "failure to use reasonable care for
his own safety would constitute contributory negligence."
The rationale is basic. It cannot be determined if
the jury followed the good or bad instruction, and this
invalidates the presmnption that they arrived at a proper
verdict. In Ivie v. Richardson, 9 U 2d J, 336 P.2d 781,
where two instructions were in direct conflict - one
omitting, and the other including, contributory negligence on the point of plaintiff's right to a nrdict, and
there were other minor, but cumulative, errors, the court,
in reversing for error, applied this test, "The question
is whether the case was presented to the jury in such
a manner that it is reasonable to believe there was a
fair and impartial analysis of the evidence and a just
verdict."
The specific language of Instruction 20 logically
amplifies and controls the general language of Instruc·
tion 22. The general rule in this respect may be found
in 5 Am J ur 2d, Appeal and Error, §891, citing the
case of People v. Flack, 26 N.E. 267, N.Y., (1891),
in which the defendant was charged with criminal con·
spiracy. The court in the cited case set forth the rule
adverted to in the following fashion:
It is a rn le founded upon good sense, and the mosi
obvious propriety than in construing a charge
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either in a civil or criminal case, the whole charge
is to be considered together, and that a judgment
will not be reversed for an erroneous instruction
which was corrected by the judge where it appears with reasonable certainty that the jury was
not misled. The rule is adopted in the interest of
substantial justice. On the one hand, the court will
not fasten upon an isolated clause in the charge,
which may seem to be erroneous as a ground for
reversing a judgment where the charge as a whole
states the true rule of law, and it can be seen that
no in}ury resulted from the alleged error; so, on
the other hand, where the whole drift of a charge
on a particular question is erroneous, the error
will not be cured because expressfons may be
found in the charge which, standing alone, would
free it from the objections urged. 26 N.E. at 271.
(emphasis added).
Utah law is clearly in line with the general rule just
stated on this subject. If the jury is likely to have been
misled, it is reversible error. If there is "any reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff did not have a fair trial
and that the result would have been different in the
absence of such error," the trial court should be reversed.
Badger v. Clayson, 18 U 2d 329, 422 P.2d 665 at 667;
Wilson v. Gardner, 10 U 2d 89, 348 P.2d 931, at 934,
(1960). Giving Instruction 20 such a reading, the conclusion is inescapable that the jury was misled wherein
it was instructed that plaintiff must personally "discover any observable hazards in unloading the pipe,"
leaving plaintiff no alternative or qualification.
The whole drift of the charge is tantamount to
direeting a wrdict for the defendant, even though plain-
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tiff was supported by his own expert witnesses and one
of defendant's, and defendant's had admitted, on cross.
that blocking was their duty, and evidence that plaintiff could reasonably rely on that. In sum, the facts,
read impartially, do support plaintiff, and give plausibility to the conclusion that the jury was led to apply
an erroneously strict standard against plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore, plaintiff-appellant prays that judgment
be vacated and a new trial granted in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
SAlVlUEL KING
KING, CRAFT & BULLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
409 Boston Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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